Moral Epistemology and Moral Methodology

I confront the fact that ethics is hard. I argue that there may be an asymmetry in how testimony affects what one is justified in believing, that there is nothing wrong with “relying on intuitions” in ethics, and that failure to realize something is only sometimes exculpatory.

 “Ethics is Hard! What Follows?” in Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility, Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, eds., Oxford, forthcoming. (Abstract)

“Moral Testimony Goes Only So Far,” Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, 2019. (Abstract)

“When is Failure to Realize Something Exculpatory?” in Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition, Philip Robichaud and Jan Willem Wieland, eds., Oxford, 2017. (Abstract)

“Is It Reasonable to ‘Rely on Intuitions’ in Ethics?” in Norton Introduction to Philosophy, Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin, eds., Norton, 2015. (Abstract)

“The Irrelevance of Moral Uncertainty,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 2015. (Abstract)

“Transformative Experiences and Reliance on Moral Testimony,” Res Philosophica, 2015. (Abstract)

“‘I’ll Be Glad I Did It’ Reasoning and the Significance of Future Desires,” Philosophical Perspectives, 2009. (Abstract)

“Does Moral Ignorance Exculpate?” Ratio, 2011. (Abstract)